“The man of knowledge must not only love his enemies, he must be able to hate his friends.” (See Walter Kaufmann’s translation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, On the Gift-Giving Virtue, section 3, page 78)
For a long time, I never quite knew how to interpret this passage. My understanding made use of unclear concepts. Maybe some hybrid of soul, individual, or person.
But the treatment I had made of an apple (See 23.05.15, Reflection on the Visual Field) can likewise be made to any friend, colleague, or lover. The entity sight of T shares no experiential properties with the entity voice or laugh of T. She is neither sight nor sound, nor a composition of all of these (Consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s broomstick. See G.E.M. Anscrombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte’s translation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, section 60, page 33e).
Think of the following entities which go by the name T: When speaking to T, “I forgive you” (an objective entity). Or, the image of T walking down the hall (a sensual entity). Or when speaking to another, “T is the cause of this” (an explanatory entity which directs future actions). In each case I have a different entity. Despite this, a thematic entity or a sensual entity may answer ownedness to the objective entity T. So, with such an entity, taken up in several ways, I might as well dissolve the entity T.
And in recognizing the dissolution of any friend, colleague, or lover, I no longer have need to resolve any feeling of love, intellectual euphoria, disrespect, disgust of humor, or sexual stimulation toward any particular soul, individual, or person.