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OPUSCULE



TERMINUS MECHANICAE

A lecture and collection of remarks and reflections from www.terminusmechanicae.com by JUSTIN CARMEN





OPUSCULE 03, v.01
TERMINUS MECHANICAE

I have given this publication the title *Terminus Mechanicae*. The work contains lecture notes inspired from a collection of remarks and reflections from a website of the same name which ran from July 2014 until this past summer.

The title identifies a terminus—an end of mechanics. A time when and a location where mechanical description comes to an end. In identifying an end, it makes explicit mechanical description is not the only possible way of describing the world.

The ambition of *Terminus Mechanicae* is to engage consideration of entities which lay beyond description in terms of time and space.

1. Consider the thoughts which are provoked from the classical philosophical puzzles of Zeno's Paradoxes. These puzzles are said to have had the purpose of challenging popular intuition and render motion an impossibility.
2. Of those paradoxes, consider Achilles and the tortoise. There is great imagery here. Yet, imagine an alternate illustration with different conditions. In this version, the first definite of the paradox remains, the speed of Achilles, the

faster runner. Imagine him however fast you wish, it does not matter. The second definite also remains, the speed of the tortoise. And likewise, imagine him however slow you wish. Finally, a third definite, the distance to the finish line. However, in this version both contestants begin at the same starting position with one qualifier—the endurance of Achilles which decreases his speed to half whenever he reaches half way the distance to be traveled.

3. Now, who finishes the race first?—remember you can imagine seemingly infinite difference in speed between them. Well, after all, it is the slower. And that is the case, however definitely slow you imagine him to be. But why? Well, as distance is infinitely divisible, Achilles never finishes the race.
4. With this illustration we are confronted with the divisibility of an infinite entity, *distance*. And if we liken the mathematical entity *distance* to a physical entity *space*, we are confronted with the infinite divisibility of a physical space.
5. Now, physics describes definites within measurements of time and space. These are our physical entities, 'real' and tangible. And if we take 4. to be the case (that mathematical *duration* and *distance* map one-to-one onto *time* and *space*) then these definites exist

necessarily within infinite entities, *physical time* and *physical space*.

6. But also we think of *physical time* and *physical space* in the same way in which we think of the entities within them, as something 'real' and tangible. For example, we hear talk that the universe is expanding. This language is built on observations of physical entities 'in' space—the relations between them.

These relations suggest a physical universe is expanding. But the expression also calls into consideration an end of that expanding physical space—"the edge of the universe." The imagery is hard to resist and impossible to imagine.

Likewise, when we hear talk of the beginning of the universe we draw up imagery where physical time has a beginning.

7. But what does it mean to apply definiteness to entities like physical time and physical space? Can these have an end which would place them within the same criteria as the finite physical entities 'in' time and space?
8. Contemporary physics has proposed the entities *planck time* and *planck length* which limit the measurability of physical time and physical space. But the smallest measurable space does not resolve the discomfort over the *logic* of a finite physical time or a finite physical

space, at either direction, even if this finity is part of that space's *nature*.¹

9. At the large end, upon having thoughts of an end of physical space, I would be willing to guess that many adopt an expression like "the observable universe" and with that imply an "unknown" beyond "the observable" space. (The thought here is that everything observable could be contained in a whole theory, without recourse to observing that "unknown".)
10. However, let us suspend consideration of the "unknown" and "mystery" for a moment. Maybe taking time and space as physical entities 'real' and tangible is presumptuous and the question of number 7. is simply misguided. But if physical time and physical space do not fall within the logic of other physical and finite entities, we first want to ask, "Well, what is a physical entity then?"
11. I take it that today we are used to taking physical entities, objective entities, and sensual entities as one type—colloquially, the 'real'. If I say "physical object" I seem to mean a tangible entity which has more 'reality' than the number three, for example. But do I even know what a

¹See the lecture notes for "*What?*"—"I Mean Love" Appendix A: *Reflection on Nature*.

physical object is when I use this expression? What does it mean to use the word *physical*, *real*, *objective*, or *sensual*—surely I want to mean something.

12. And with these questions, I have set the frame. In thinking about entities, as entities, we reach the terminus—mechanical description comes to an end.
13. In order to consider this fundamental constitution of entities, think on the peculiar question, “What does the number three look like?” And I do not mean to ask about the Roman or Arabic numeral. Could I answer that the number three looks like three pencils?
14. I will ask a second peculiar question. What does the number three taste like? Here you are probably inclined to think this question is more nonsensical than the previous. But why?—What if I dropped lemon juice on your tongue three times? Isn’t this the same translation of the number three only into another sense?
15. Yet, I expect that no one would be satisfied with this sensual description of the number three. The number three must not be a sensual entity—but then of what ‘nature’ is it? Let us not say *conceptual* and try to dismiss it at that.
16. Try this experiment: think of a *wooden object* but not the sight or the smell. Could you have either the entity *sight of wood* or *smell of wood* without having a *wooden object*? I can imagine it. Therefore, in a certain way of speaking I could say that the wooden object **itself** is a *non-sensual* entity. After all, the sensual entities can be stripped from it—much like the *objective virus* in a lab?² If I take wood to be objective, what does it mean then, to be an *object*?
17. Suspending the objective question for a moment: if we can at least admit the *object wood* to being non-sensual, does it then fall into the category of the theoretical or the conceptual? And if so, would this exclude physicality from it?

The point here is that when you first thought to dismiss the number three as conceptual, you probably weren’t thinking of dismissing *wood* or *virus* as non-sensual too—or admitting that these could fall within the same category as the ‘conceptual’ number three.

²See lecture *The Romantic*.

18. Next, I will show you this picture:



19. Then I will show you this picture:



20. In the first set of pictures, did you find three of something? Imagine that you want to describe each one of them to a friend and do not wish to describe your experience of them. Therefore, you exclude the scrutiny with which you observed the first and the tension which you were relieved of as you passed from the second to the third. In other words, what could you say to distinguish one from the next, as another could surely experience it? And here I hope that you admit that there is no reliable description which would distinguish them.
21. Are you now tempted to say that in the first set of pictures *mystery* surrounds each one? (You might be tempted to since the picture looks incomplete.) Would you also be tempted to say that this property, *mystery*, gives rise to suspicion that these are actually different things?
22. Even if suspicion accompanies these things, think on the task of description in 20.. Does this change your results? Surely it does not change the sensual entity at hand. But maybe it changes the conceptual entity?
Ultimately, we have to answer, no. *Being a mystery* does not give cause to declare them as different entities, sensual or conceptual.
23. Now consider the two sets of pictures in 18. and 19. together. Are you tempted to say that the bottom-most figure of the first set was simply covered or blanked out and that the bottom-most figure of the second set is the same thing, only now revealed? If you thought this, then you took *change* into account.
24. And with change as a theme you are now nearing another of Zeno's Paradoxes. The Arrow Paradox. It runs something like this,

If everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always occupying such a space at any moment, the flying arrow is therefore motionless.³
25. Consider a question which is provoked from this paradox. Is the arrow the same arrow at each moment? Consider the first moment in which you capture the arrow (call it *arrowprime*). Let us go further and say that *change* belongs to the constitution of that entity. At a second moment of capture you have the entity *arrowprime+ten*. At a third moment you have the entity *arrowprime+twenty*, and so on. Each have, as part of their constitution, *change*.
Are these the same entity or are each a distinct entity? In a certain way of speaking you could say that each are different. After all, *arrowprime+twenty* has qualities which *arrowprime+ten* does not. Perhaps *arrowprime+twenty* has *being at a velocity of*
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- ³See Aristotle's Physics VI:9, 239b5.

seventy mps and *being after five o'clock*. And perhaps *arrowprime+ten* does not have these properties.

26. In another way of speaking you could say each are the same, in that *arrowprime+20* has *being previously at the location of arrow-prime+10* as part of its constitution.

However, even if I grant this, the reconciliation could be said to merely attribute a *history* to the arrow. And it could still be argued that in light of this history, each distinct arrow at each moment of capture is still a different arrow. And now there are more to distinguish them—now there are differences in historical constitution.

27. What if we stop thinking of the moving arrow as a real and tangible entity? What if we were to qualify it as a *hypothetical* entity—is this so absurd? After all, the *moving arrow* is not *arrowprime* or *arrowprime+ten*, and it could never be any of the observed arrows no matter how many you had recorded. The *moving arrow* is a reconciliation of each historical arrow at each moment.
28. If this were the case, could we still say that the *hypothetical moving arrow* was physical? And here I hope you answer that it is surely possible to think of this arrow physically—which means, it is an entity describable in terms of physics.

However, this does not mean that this arrow is physical in the sense of *tangible*, after all, as hypothetical, it remains non-sensual. Here is where our *object wood* of 16. falls too.

29. Let us come back to the physicality of time and space in 4.. When we say, “No, I mean a physical object, not Santa Claus!”—we put conviction behind the reality of that physical object. Yet are any of these three things tangible: *time*, *space* or *Santa Claus*? If we consider physics as a logic, and the entities of that logic are *logical entities*, then physical entities are surely physical, neither *sensual* nor *tangible*. That is, they belong to the *physical world*, not a sensual one.

30. Taking physics and physical entities in this way, an entity *in* physical time and physical space is always divisible on the basis that divisibility is part of the logic in which we understand that entity.

If this were the case, much of the discomfort over physical time and physical space in 4. has been resolved. Physical time and space must denote an entity within the logic of physics—and nothing more. The question of 7. reveals itself as misguided after all and we avoid any discomfort of the “unknown.” But, of course, you must be willing to abandon the **primordality** of physics-logic.

31. To take physical time and physical space in this way may seem both natural and absurd. Most of us are vaguely aware of many types of spaces: consider the entities *time for diner* or *space for rent*—both of these are entities of a world which may or may not include physical time or physical space. *Physicality* has not yet been brought into the situation. After all, you could say *time for diner* is a prompter and *space for rent* an opportunity.
32. Even in light of something like Euclidean space, you may want to say, “No, not geometrical space, but this space” and point around you. “This space is divisible.” “Surely I can experience this space, by waving my hand through it or looking across it, feeling that time has passed.” Here you want to think that each are sensual entities. But even with these activities you have gone beyond the world of sensual entities and given a preliminary logic for taking “this space.” We now have something of a pre-logical entity at hand—even if not yet formalized as Euclidean space or physical space.
33. When I reflect on 28. I have already reached my conclusion. I want to say that as soon as an entity is defined with its history, I have *captured* the entity. And in as much as I don’t wish to take motion as an illusion, I must admit that definites in physics (entities) betray the experience of motion and experience generally. Or rather: the world of definites and the world of motion are two distinct logical worlds, which may or may not map neatly onto each other.
34. Sometimes philosophers are criticized for destroying our faculty for knowing anything at all. And if someone were to say this, I wouldn’t dispute them. After all, it speaks toward a morality which resonates with my understanding—one which is opposed to both the pursuits of science and theology, which seek to build a single and sole universe. This pursuit I have elsewhere called *epistemic imperialism*.
35. In this way, the ambition behind my current thinking manifests politically. That is, if anyone wished to speak of the validity of alternative facts, I would certainly find this acceptable, given the many possible logical worlds which we have—definites, motion, etc. And therefore, if I wanted to get around what is felt as an ‘alternative fact’, I would have to get behind that factual discourse. I would have to reach the *way of life* which lies behind it, that which motivates the conviction toward that fact.

—Justin Carmien, 13.05.17

OPUSCULE 03, v.01
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THE COLLECTED REMARKS AND REFLECTIONS
OF TERMINUS MECHANICAE

The following pages collect remarks and reflections from www.terminusmechanicae.com. My ambition in printing this collection here is to supplement the lecture with an additional consideration. Between 2014 and 2016 a particular “ontological” language developed from within that web project. The language began unfolding with the *thematic* and *theoretical* entity progressing with the *sensual*, *objective*, *historical*, and finally came to terms with the *physical* entity. Also of interest is the development of the forum for these entities: *factual discourse* and the contrasting concept, *experiential language*. Noticeably, that project lacked a substantial reflection on the *hypothetical* entity. However, now discovered, I plan a project to investigate that entity by way of the Heideggerian tradition.

Many of the entries collected here are politically charged. For the time being, I will ask anyone studying this collection to postpone consideration of this aspect—that is, until I have properly dedicated myself to publishing a thorough ontologic-political project.

30.10.12, REFLECTION ON EXPERIENTIAL LANGUAGE

Today a question draws my attention. Yet I have not raised this question to any friend, colleague, or lover, since I can only imagine the trouble it might bring along with it. Consequently, I do not know if this is a question of my own, or something easily relatable. My question regards facts. This is a question of knowledge, answered not by asking *who* or *what*, or even *how?*—but instead, *why?* My inquiry should not be mistaken. I am neither doubtful of the accuracy nor of my certainty of any particular fact.

I have found the question so fundamental that it comes to me in both trivial matters and those of serious concern. However, I must emphasize that in these matters just now spoken of I do not take caution with this question. Instead, I proceed having replaced this caution with a commitment—on the surface, one might be tempted to call this a commitment of ignorance. However, I do not theme it so shallowly.

This commitment has manifested in style throughout the preparatory writing of *Terminus Mechanicae* and it has also manifested in

procedure. When citing a translation, the translator and translated work take priority in the citation. This procedure has been adopted since I cannot presume that the same family of thoughts which are stimulated from German or Latin texts resemble those which are stimulated in the reader of an English translation. I doubt neither the accuracy of the translation nor doubt the translator's ability or trustworthiness. To be honest, I remain indifferent to these issues. My ability—and not only that, but my desire—causes me to respond to that which is stimulated from the English text.

Furthermore, a translation cited should not be considered a mere degeneration from some more original work, but instead an original source itself—in as much as that source is an *origin* of this work. And since the remarks and reflections on *Terminus Mechanicae* are a reaction to the interpretations of those translators, my commitment demands that I make no definite statement about what any translated author originally claims. Despite this, I hope to not be mistaken. I do not feel any shame in renouncing a debt to Friedrich Nietzsche or Martin

Heidegger. Rather, I am humble in acknowledging Walter Kaufmann and Hubert Dreyfus.

Following all that I have said about my commitment and the application in a procedure, the first question must be: *what does inquiry into the source tell us about the facts themselves—if not to satisfy skepticism of the absolute truth?*

Consider if, in the course of this document, I quoted the following,

The world as presentation...arises to be sure with the opening of the first eye...time is indeed standing there too with the first case of cognition, with its entire infinitude in both directions..."¹

These words, as present in my text, carry along with them meaning which a reader who came across them elsewhere would not find. First, my reader would know I have read a translation of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and*

Presentation. They might also know that I have interpreted that translation and they may guess that I have positioned myself to that translation in such-and-such a way.

So, to inquire into the source of a fact is to inquire into the history of the fact. This means that by interrogating the source, the question does not ask *who* or *what* or *how?*—but rather *why is this a fact?* And I can answer, "Because I have read, heard, felt, etc..." And when one says to another, "This is a fact", what has one learned? Well, my commitment has me assume that one has learned that *another has said, "This is a fact."* And this may or may not have consequence to the fact itself.

Perhaps now, with the challenge presented, the question which draws my attention may be appreciated and my commitment in personal and private matters, among any friend, colleague, or lover, may not seem so unusually difficult or inhuman.

¹From Richard E. Aquila's translation of Arthur Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Presentation: Volume One, First Book*, section 7, page 62.

20.07.14, REMARK ON NIETZSCHE, SPIRIT

For a healthy perspective I revisit Walter Kaufmann's translations of Friedrich Nietzsche. When reading *Beyond Good and Evil* I encounter uses of words, such as *artist* or *mother*, which do not name any person or even a demographic of people, but instead name a *thematic* entity: the spirit of the *artist* or *mother*.

Consider Nietzsche's critique of progress. What has been progressive in 'man' is that which is shared between animals, the physiological need—progressed through an understanding of mechanics. Yet, that which is 'human' (the human spirit) occurs rarely and intermittently throughout history.²

But these are only three examples found in those translations. There are others. The *creator*, the *ascetic*, the *Greek*, the *German*, the *Good European*, and yes, the *man* and *woman*.

²See Anthony M. Ludovici's translation of Friedrich Nietzsche's *The Antichrist*, section 4, page 5.

21.07.14, 27.09.14, REMARK ON KAUFMANN, WITTGENSTEIN

I can't help but feel that another could be misled by the epilogue of Walter Kaufmann's *Nietzsche*. A remark about Friedrich Nietzsche's "similarities to Ludwig Wittgenstein" appears between talk of language, grammar and ordinary language in Analytic Philosophy. But consider the careful language of the following translation from Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*.

...the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a *becoming master*, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even obliterated.³

³From Walter Kaufmann's translation of Friedrich Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Second Essay, section 12, page 77.

The example which the translation generalizes on is punishment—which is taken up as a natural and observable phenomenon. The translation builds upon several meanings of punishment, creating a story of punishment. Yet the passage asks for an origin of this *historical* entity (“somehow”) and cannot answer it. The passage leaves open the mystery of how any *thing* first comes to be at all. When I think on Wittgenstein’s remarks on Martin Heidegger’s question on the meaning of being, I find that both texts draw my attention to something of a *boundary of language*. This prevents expression of the “what” of an entity before it came to be as it is—and further, the “how” of that becoming.

I can very well think what Heidegger means by Being and Angst. Man has the drive to run up against the boundaries of language. Think, for instance, of the astonishment that **anything exists**.

This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is no answer to it. All that we say can, *a priori*, be nonsense. Never the less we run up against the boundary of language.⁴

This boundary lies behind my reading of all three authors, yet there is an appeal in the method of argumentation in Wittgenstein which is lacking in the other two (and only with Heidegger do I read a possible way to talk of this organic, primordial and unspeakable entity—*my* understanding of the *ready to hand*). This is why to merely mention language, grammar and ordinary language in Analytic Philosophy overlooks the more interesting possibility of reading out of these works the grounds of a similar ontological understanding.

⁴From Brian McGuinness and Joachim Schulte’s translation of *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*.

28.07.14, REFLECTION ON SCIENCE, RELIGION

I enjoy reading philosophy in that it is an activity. The same cannot be said of science—reading on a scientific discovery. I do not know what I am supposed to do once I have read it. What does the author of the article suppose I do? “This observation has proven the theory true”—But what matters this true theory? I am not a practitioner within this field? What am I supposed to do with it? Gossip?

A similar problem arises when reading religious texts. However, here I have been shown a way to get involved—I could make a psychological exegesis. Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, for example.⁵

In saying this, I do mean to say that while both of these activities are shrouded with disengagement, the scientific text could meet the religious text only with a similar type of *discovery in interpretation*.

⁵See Anthony M. Ludovici’s translation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s *The Antichrist* or Katherine Jones’ translation of Sigmund Freud’s *Moses and Monotheism*.

27.09.14, REMARK ON HEIDEGGER, BEING-WITH, A:

After studying John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson's translation of *Being and Time* for nearly two years, I am of the opinion, as I was from the first reading, that *being with* cannot be an *existentiale* of which there is reciprocation. But in saying so, this does not exclude *being with* from worthy qualification.

If *being authentic* or *being owned* is the way of being divorced from a generic anyone, and *being authentic* or *being owned* does not have the possibility for multiplicity, then the possibility of authenticity or ownedness is an inappropriate way to talk about any particular friend, colleague, or lover—and I am sure that these words name another way of being (being a *theoretical* entity, which architectonically may fall near a *thematic* entity⁶).

⁶See 20.07.14, *Remark on Nietzsche, Spirit*.

27.09.14, REMARK ON HEIDEGGER, BEING-WITH, B:

By now, many must have considered the treatment of epistemological skepticism in *Being and Time*.

Even if Heidegger is right that we have “access” to entities within-the-world more primordially than by way of cognition, it is nonetheless true that we do sometimes cognize those objects, try to know them. When we do try to know them cognitively we can entertain skeptical worries about that knowledge.⁷

And as I understand *being with* (A), a skeptic could replace “object” in this quote with “friend, colleague, or lover”. But if one wants to make that amendment, then they should remember that successfully challenging the constitution of an entity can only lead to a description of a new entity. One might say, “You can trust M, he has integrity”—and there is no doubt. Even if I were to

⁷See William Blattner’s *Heidegger’s Being and Time*, chapter 3, section XI, page 112.

recommend another to, “Question G’s intention” I am still confident as to G’s constitution. I am confident that she is *an entity to question*. Perhaps the skeptic who wants to get to know his friend has forgotten that the *being present* of that entity resists a description of a substance changing over time—one can only admit an entity to stand as it is. Instead it could be that a new entity is already found. Perhaps what one now has before them is not a friend, but a *friend opened to change*. Perhaps from friend into lover?

So, despite my above statement (A) no one should give credence to skeptical thoughts. That is, no one should worry over becoming detached from anyone or of becoming detached from the world—there is always the primordial connection, even in acknowledging my understanding of *being with* (A).





07.02.15, REFLECTION ON MY OWN UNDERSTANDING

22.05.2011, Who could believe the universe fiddles a congruent song that they have been granted permission to hear? Who could be so audacious as to assume that their united front is the united front of all the universe—and that they are not one of the thousand thousands which stand outside? Who could believe that the fiddles of a thousand thousands fiddle with them? Who could suffer from so much vanity and exert so much arrogance onto the world? And if one could overcome their selfishness over the world—that is to say, an ego-coddling humanism—how could their modesty before the world allow them that which is so well concealed within that Christian plea, “Forgive them Father, for they know not what they do”—and best expressed in an appeal to science today?

—I wrote the previous passage many years ago. It embodies an understanding which I had then assumed—*humility before the universe*—opposite to a certain scientific or Christian arrogance. Now I read this passage all wrong, and I find myself having to remember how I understood it when I wrote it.

Now I want to say, "Everything is known. Everything is exactly what I can say about it, and nothing more." The understanding here is different. What I wish to express is a *modesty about what can be meant* when meaning anything.

I think on an entity such as gravity, and furthermore ask myself, "What else could gravity be besides what I mean by that word?" In one use *gravity* may mean a sensual entity, as understood in, "Look, this rock is heavy" while raising and lowering it. Or it may be an explanation as a theoretical entity, as understood in, "These apples fell." Or more humbly, *gravity* may mean something like *certain results which are expected upon testing*. But if I say "a mystery" then it is surely a mystery, since in naming it a mystery it is invested with meaning—*mystery* is then part of the entity's constitution. And if one would choose to talk otherwise and suggest that mystery is not essential to the entity *gravity*, and instead think of *mystery* as a placeholder for that which is undiscovered, then they have not considered the 'evolution' which the entity gravity must take before it is wholly known.

In the end, I concluded that whether *humility before the universe* or *a modesty about what can be meant*, the attitude which I oppose remains the same from my previous understanding throughout to my new one.

23.05.15, REFLECTION ON THE VISUAL FIELD

At some point I began to think of the entities of the visual field as something pure and the entities of language seemed to me something merely referential.

However, I think on the many visual understandings which I can take up which, after reflection, reveal individual visual 'sentences' and visual 'words'. These visual entities too belong to a language—a visual one.

Yet, there is nothing novel in talking about a visual language (this is everyday talk among my colleagues). So, why does this feel so profound? Well, just as there is no necessary overlap in the languages of the sciences,⁸ there is no necessary overlap in any visual languages either. Are the vase and the two faces⁹ honestly the same visual entity? You could say that the lines which compose them are, but to 'see' an entity as geometrical/spatial relationships belongs to yet another language altogether—a language of geometry or spatiality.

⁸See lecture "What?"—"I Mean Love".

⁹The famous ambiguous image by Danish psychologist Edgar Rubin.

And finally, I should not expect that any language of objects, for example, to map neatly onto any entity in one of my visual languages.

I am in possession of many languages—visual, audible, tactile—and each of these have their own world to which they belong. Take the case of an apple. The entity *taste of apple* shares no experiential properties with the entity *sight of apple*, and in turn neither of these shares an experiential property with any particular entity *apple*. (Someone can mean apple without meaning taste or sight—*apple as location*, for example.) Despite this, the entity *taste of apple* and *sight of apple* may answer ownedness to an entity, *apple*.

So, with such an entity taken up in several ways, I might as well forget that entity's singularity—dissolve that entity. Instead of as an entity with properties, I should think of each as independent—and some entities answer *ownedness* as part of their constitution.

Therefore, I can accept the visual field as a background, undifferentiated—yet no visual entity themed there could be pure.

30.05.15, REFLECTION ON PHYSICALISM, DISSONANCE

I look at an apple and experience it in two ways. In one case I experience the apple as a united sensual experience, and in another case the *apple* itself dissolves once *sight of apple* and *taste of apple* are stripped from it as independent. The *object apple* feels like something *hypothetical*. Yet, physical entities have always been the most concrete and 'real' thing!

Now, I could simply remove the dissonance by accepting things in a common way¹⁰—which is to accept that before experience there are physical things with properties, some of which we know and some of which are yet to be discovered. And

¹⁰Here I use *common* to suppose a world for a populous of minds to share. Contrast this to the word *popular* which for me is also a terminological word, yet belongs to a less burdened language and simply recognizes that which occurs often in language. In as much as this is how I understand these words, the language of *the popular* does not carry along with it the same suppositions as *the common*, that is, of other minds or a common world.

why not accept this?—after all, everyone loves the “mysteries of the universe.”

While this appeal feels modest enough, I cannot help but feel an arrogance behind it. I mean, I do not wish to refute any fan of the sciences on “the things we know for certain”. Only I understand that he can't possibly mean as much as he thinks he does. That is, a scientific fact only has meaning within a certain scientific understanding. And I can't pretend that his understanding is the understanding which holds the possibility to explain everything. Simply think on the many scientific meanings of love for example.¹¹

Tonight I will accept the dissonance, if that is the consequence. I prefer to suffer with it, rather than permit myself the arrogance which accompanies factual discourse.

¹¹See lecture “What?”—“I Mean Love”.

19.07.15, REFLECTION ON THE DISCLOSURE OF WORLD

Consider *the fall of man*. Then think on another who makes use of the language of the fall. How does another who speaks in this way speak of the world? Well, another's world would surely be a fallen one—which could not be 'cleansed by baptism'. Either another speaks in a way which discloses a fallen world and experiences the fall again-and-again or another does not speak of the fall authentically—like God himself, that entity, *the fall*, would **pervade** the world.

Perhaps the fallen world is disclosed in a resentful remark toward bad influence in one's teenage years—or in a remark regarding the corruption of politicians. The fall serves as an *explanation* in both cases; further, it serves as a *reason* for an attitude.

12.12.15, REFLECTION ON HISTORIC ENTITIES

Should I have to dismiss the priority of any historic entity to any 'present' entity which has, as part of its constitution, the possibility of *affirmation before the senses*?—for example, *sight of apple* or *taste of apple*. Often I find that historic entities strike me harder than 'present' entities—and do so in such a way that they draw me away from anything 'actually' present—I have placed 'actually' and 'present' in quotation marks since any historic entity is just as present. I mean, any historic entity exists only as a memory or as a story which has been written, and that memory or the reading, telling, or hearing of a story is surely present.

Imagine a scene in which two are lying in bed together. One reveals to another a past which involves a moral offense of sexual nature. It would not be too hard to imagine that this historical entity could color the moment. Surely the presence of this historic entity has potential to color the sexuality of that moment.

I, in the story of my life, allow the historic entity do what it wants to. Intensify. Color or distract. Fade away. After all, why deny myself the strength of that experience?—because of my 'happiness'? (This is opposite the wisdom of "letting go".)

19.12.15, REFLECTION ON UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE

"We describe reality. Or at least our descriptions are compatible with reality. Just look what we have uncovered!"

Or "We live the righteous life. Just look how they live. Their world is disgusting. We live in the true world."

Or "My languages are just several of many. And each are just as right or wrong as the next."

—All three are a form of universal language, yet the first and second express a certain arrogance, while the last acknowledges a certain modesty.

18.06.16, REFLECTION ON DISPOSITION, OBJECTIVITY

When we were imagining ourselves as scientists in a lab¹² and exclaimed, “I simply discovered nature!” We were referring not to the observation itself—not to the sensual entity—but to an *object virus*.

And isn’t it the same with feelings? Don’t I simply “discover” them? And once identified as *feeling*, don’t I read them backward into my own history, forever how long or short that duration may be?

But I do expect that disposition (feeling or mood) to be the most unlikely thing to call objective—these are not entities we find in the *common world*—and this is the popular distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. (I suppose that here I am making less of a claim to dispositions and instead drawing boundaries to an area which I would like to call *objectivity*.)

¹²See lecture *The Romantic*.

After all, I’m not surprised when I find myself anxious with the thought that I will lecture soon. And I’m not surprised when I find that I am still in love, despite that the relationship is far behind me. Quite the opposite. It’s to be expected that I experience a detachment from and disownment of my most ‘subjective’ feelings. That is, I find them in the same way I find anything else in nature. And it does not feel strange whatsoever to call my feelings *natural*. They are natural things—or should I say natural *entities*?¹³

¹³I’m not sure which word to use here. “Things” feels better than “entities” and I do not make a terminological distinction, they are interchangeable everywhere in my current writing. See Albert Hofstadter’s translation of Martin Heidegger’s *The Thing* in *Poetry, Language, Thought*.

02.07.16, REFLECTION ON A UNIVERSE

The pursuit of physics is one of building a universe by describing it in terms of physical entities. Compare this with the pursuit of the Theosophical Society which constructs a history in reconciling theologies. Whether manifested in the physical, theological or otherwise, this universe building I want to theme in spirit something similar to imperialism. Maybe something of an *epistemic imperialism*.

Just as a Christian lives with the *fall of man* in every experience¹⁴ the lived world of disassociated entities¹⁵ is for me not a psychological state to be overcome through clarification in the relationship between entities. Instead it is lived in every linguistic experience, again and again.

Living in this world of disassociated entities is opposed to the pursuit of describing of a universe.

¹⁴See 19.07.15, *Reflection on the Disclosure of World*.

¹⁵See 30.05.15, *Reflection on Physicalism, Dissonance*.

30.07.16, REFLECTION ON TRUE/FALSE CLAIMS, EXPERIENCE

Consider the question: "Do you believe in god?" This is probably the wrong question. Unless you can accept the answer, "I do not **experience** Him." However, if you expect an enumeration of true/false claims to *convince* you, I do not know why you have asked this question; after all, you will not be convinced. This is not the sort of game that is played with God.

If another tells me about her experience of God, I will believe her. Another's experience of God may be true, and this would be based on her feeling of the truth. And this is completely acceptable despite whatever a *factualist* might claim.

For me it is the same for *evolution* or the *fall of man*. I do not experience these things.

06.08.16, REFLECTION ON TRUTH, AUTHORSHIP

You can't help the feelings you have. You simply have them—until you don't. Same for your truths. Think of the experience of making a conclusion: you explore two or more rationalized fantasies. You observe how the fantasy strikes you—but you still are subject to your nature. You can't simply *decide* to have one feeling about a 'fantasy' or 'truth' over another.

So we are confronted with a certain paradox: you are completely subjected to your truths, yet you are the sole author of them.

31.12.16, REFLECTION ON VALIDATION, FACTS

It is not always clear to me what scientific gossip is getting at, while I feel something essential in the speech of a religious person—in as much as they talk from experience itself. Yet, when a creation apologist constructs an exhibition in which men and dinosaurs live together, he is instead fighting a factual battle. And here I can't help but feel this argument starts from a weakened position—since it starts from a burdened position of reconciling texts and traditions.

There is a style of living in which validation is not necessary anyway. (It is possible that my experience can't tell me one way or another about a fact—but why doubt the fact either? You don't have to play the *facts game* in order to win an audience.) Simply think on the impossibility

of validating love.¹⁶ Or pain. And then take as a positive example the possibility of experiencing the fall of man.¹⁷ No other will be able to tell me about this experience, which is yours, and I will have a lot to learn about the world (colloquially 'my' world).

Perhaps all of this is because I want to defend *the experience* and wish for a partner among the religious. The weight of a factual world weighs too heavy in conversation. There is something of a spirit of imperialism which paints everything around me—including discourse and knowledge.¹⁸

¹⁶See lecture *The Romantic*.

¹⁷See 19.07.15, *Reflection on the Disclosure of World*.

¹⁸See 02.07.16, *Reflection on a Universe*.

07.01.17, REFLECTION ON THE FEELING OF REALITY

Earlier this year I read of the experience of the sensual entity *gravitational wave*. And this experience came forward as the discovery of this entity.

While I have been critical over the 'discovery' of entities through science in the past, I have now resolved much of my frustration in qualifying physical entities as distinct from objective or sensual ones. What strikes me now regards the *feeling of reality* which leads to a disposition of conviction toward the 'reality' of those scientific entities. In this case, the sensual entity *gravitational wave* allowed for the confidence in an objective entity, spoken of through the language of the theory and spoken of as the entity *gravitational wave* in that theory.

Nietzsche too seems to have addressed this feeling; though, the positive **authoritative** aspect is lost as the reflection is nestled in an argument

about deception (lying).¹⁹

It is my assumption that Christians too feel this reality in Jesus Christ—in their experience of his reality. I hear the convictions of the scientific-political and the religious alike.

(Consider a few: for example, the subversive manifestations of this feeling. Consider the rhetoric of the political left, John Stewart's *The Daily Show*, which appeals with a sarcastic/malicious humor persecuting those ignorant to *his* world. Then contrast this to those who attack the **righteousness** of the convinced. Without committing to any content themselves they have said much about their reality. The political right seems to have been the first to commandeer this spirit—a quite admirable movement in the history of truth discourse.)

¹⁹See Ronald Speirs' translation of Friedrich Nietzsche's *On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense*.

10.03.17, REFLECTION ON PHYSICALISM, IDEAS

Consider the problem of the nature of reality—this problem asks what is to constitute as real. Is wood the same entity as timber?—only timber has something added to it (it is a *wood building material*). Still, couldn't the entity timber exist without ever understanding the entity wood? Compare *timber* to *toothpick*. Since a toothpick can be made from wood or plastic one could be tempted to say that *wood* is more real than a *toothpick*? But why?—is the answer because a toothpick is only that by virtue of its 'cultural context'? But this reveals a bias—one which might have another say that only material is real, or only that which can exist *outside cultural context* and *objective* is real.

Now, I can imagine the difficulty in my encounter with one who understands the priority of physical entities, or worse, the priority of the material constitution of an entity. (Even in the translation

of Friedrich Nietzsche I read of physiological priority.²⁰)

I can imagine, in an extreme case, one might attempt to reduce all other understanding to irrelevancy—since "in the end we all return to the earth." The purpose of this appeal is clear, it is a reaction to intolerance (heard among many 'minority' groups).

Surely if another gives the physical an objective priority that removes the possibility of prioritizing anything 'subjective'. And this is the power of its appeal. But I could never adopt this *ontological hierarchy*. I mean, am I supposed to accept a lifestyle by eliminating the significance of all, including my own?—what self-degradation?!

²⁰See, for example, R.J. Hollingdale's translation of Friedrich Nietzsche's *Daybreak, Book II*, section 119.

15.07.17, REFLECTION ON FACTUAL DISCOURSE

It is clear to me why a movement like the flat-earthers has gained in popularity. But let's be honest—these people are not ignorant of the facts which total the understanding that the earth's shape is that of a sphere. This is neither a question of cultural exposure nor lack of comprehension. It must be rooted in something more fundamental.

It is apparent to me that today there is a fundamental reaction against *factual discourse* and toward *experiential discourse*—a consequence of experiencing *fact as gossip*.²¹

Therefore, I am certain that flat-earthers are a symptom. And I am completely sympathetic to them despite that I believe they have taken themselves to a self-harming extreme. Despite this, there is a positive aspect in the movement, such as the mockery of **inconsequent** factual discourse.

²¹See 30.10.12, *Reflection on Experiential Language* and 28.07.14, *Reflection on Science, Religion*.

16.07.17, REFLECTION ON OPPRESSION, FACTUAL DISCOURSE

Despite whatever social oppression of which I have read in the news or in history, that discourse feels irrelevant today. And those championing against race, gender, or socioeconomic oppression feel quite shallow. My guess is that future generations will find this historical continuum quite petty, hardly *their* history.

However, I do feel a certain oppression present in popular discourse: the humiliation of the subjective experiences——“Well that is your subjective **opinion!**”——as if true/false claims alone have the right to enter into public discourse.

Even if technology one day removes the need of truth/lie claims in public discourse, those claims will forever remain relevant (for example, if later the technology was removed). However, I cannot see any other outcome for public true/false discourse other than the fate which has fallen good/evil discourse——irrelevancy. Within the public these arguments divert attention from essential discourse——the expression of personal experience; therefore, I find myself apathetic to them.

22.07.17, REFLECTION ON METHOD, SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Why does a comparison between science and religion seem to lack any substance? Well, today we are plagued by a priority of the method by which we know a fact. So while the method of religion (revelation) seems quite shallow, apparently there is nothing to compare. But method is not the only parameter and, after all, it might be the least essential to life.

Try instead to consider the content itself, you will find much to compare—and the discussion is much more interesting once method is removed. Try contrasting the world disclosed by science and one disclosed by religion. If you do, you will find that behind them lie very different ways of life.

For an everyday example simply think on Christopher Nolan's *Interstellar*—that story can only resonate with one who is attuned to a scientific worldview—a "mankind triumphing over an objective nature." This message manifests by way of dramatics: through a redemption of mankind itself. First we are presented with a picture in which mankind has destroyed his home. Mankind then fails once more in a savior figure, Dr. Man—an individual succumb to his own *humanity*. Yet, the story resolves by way of a de-individualized *mankind* which redeems itself in a physical future man.

I, for my part, found much disgust in the audacity of this morality.

30.09.17, REMARK ON NIETZSCHE, FRIENDS

The man of knowledge must
not only love his enemies, he must
be able to hate his friends.²²

For a long time, I never quite knew how to interpret this passage. My understanding made use of unclear concepts. Maybe some hybrid of *soul, individual, or person*.

But the treatment I had made of an apple²³ can likewise be made to any *friend, colleague, or lover*. The entity *sight of T* shares no experiential properties with the entity *voice or laugh of T*. She is neither sight nor sound, nor a composition of all of these (Consider Ludwig Wittgenstein's broomstick²⁴).


²²See Walter Kaufmann's translation of Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra, On the Gift-Giving Virtue*, section 3, page 78.

²³See 23.05.15, *Reflection on the Visual Field*.

²⁴See G.E.A. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte's translation of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, section 60, page 33e.

Think of the following entities which go by the name T: When speaking to T, "I forgive *you*" (an objective entity). Or, the *image of T* walking down the hall (a sensual entity). Or when speaking to another, "*T* is the cause of this" (an explanatory entity which directs future actions). In each case I have a different entity. Despite this, a thematic entity or a sensual entity may answer *ownedness* to the objective entity *T*. So, with such an entity, taken up in several ways, I might as well dissolve the entity T.

And in recognizing the dissolution of any friend, colleague, or lover, I no longer have need to resolve any feeling of love, intellectual euphoria, disrespect, disgust of humor, or sexual stimulation toward any particular soul, individual, or person.



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