Reflections in this article follow from a conversation with Aleksandr Dugin, recorded on May 27th, 2023. My ambition going into this conversation was to understand Dugin’s relationship to fourth political theory. I consider the importance of the announcement of fourth political theory is unquestionable. The metaphysics of Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (“Being and Time”, 1927) encourages the explication of a new political theory. The evidence for this claim is the explanatory power of that metaphysics which have usurped the epistemological metaphysics of Enlightenment literature. Treating the I as the subject matter of metaphysics is simply unsatisfactory; the same is true for the subject of political theory. Yet, the metaphysics of Being and Time has not been granted the opportunity for proving itself in our everyday interpersonal commerce—at least, not to the extent of liberalism’s individual-centric subject or communism’s economic-class-centric subject has. To be sure, Heidegger himself was not a politician or statesman. He did not consider an actual time and place to test his metaphysics. Explicitly lacking in his works is strategic thinking. As such, we are left with only his later writing, which constitutes a critique of modernity and the announcement of the “second commencement for philosophy”. At most, his later writings present us with directives in late-stage liberal political economy. If we then couple this deficiency in the literature with his involvement with and hopes for National Socialism as the vehicle for the metaphysics of Being and Time, we find the occasion for much speculation. While Dugin is not the first to make an attempt at closing the gap between the metaphysics of Being and Time and politics, he has announced a vehicle for doing so. Dugin has announced da sein (“being there”) as a subject matter of a fourth political theory. This theory promises to transcend the other major modern political ideologies: liberalism, communism, and fascism/nationalism. Yet, to my understanding, Dugin has not written thoroughly about the constitution of this theory. Therefore, an explication of the constitution of fourth political theory is needed. I presume that an understanding of Dugin’s interpretation of fourth political theory will help us with encountering the constitution of fourth political theory. These presumptions guided my conversation with Dugin. Though, admittedly, the whole of fourth political theory could not have surfaced during our hour-long conversation. Much more can be said about it. I will leave it up to Dugin if what is written in this article gives cause for a second meeting.

Preface to the conversation

In order to consider Dugin’s relationship to fourth political theory, I assumed it was necessary to first consider Heidegger’s da sein as both subiectum (“the cause or condition for the being of the world”) and the subject matter of fourth political theory. Because of this necessity, I prefaced my conversation with Dugin by way of an introduction on the distinction between subiectum and subject. Yet, this was not all. In my introduction, I also stated that we required an agreement on Heidegger’s abandonment of Being and Time and Heidegger’s failure to answer the principal question posed by that study—namely, “the meaning of being”. After all, and because Heidegger abandoned Being and Time, it might appear as if any political theory which takes da sein as its subject matter might ignore Heidegger’s own biographical moves and his own understanding of the trajectory of Western history. Immediately, Dugin passed over my second assumption and instead spent a considerable amount of time on my distinction between da sein as subiectum and as subject matter of fourth political theory. He followed my preface with what might be called Heidegger’s “phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle”. Therefore, I will briefly recapitulate this interpretation of Aristotle. After doing this, I can resume my reflections on the important topics and the outstanding questions of my conversation with Dugin.

The Phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle and “the here” of da sein

In order to consider Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle, let us first remind ourselves of Heidegger’s phenomenological method. For Heidegger, “phenomenology” does not refer to any discipline of phenomenology (φαινομενον λογια), which could be studied in the same way as psychology, sociology, or biology. Even less so could phenomenology refer to some phenomenologic (φαινομενον λογος)—that is, a λογος (logos, “logic, discourse, study”) by which the phenomena come into accord with one another. Rather, for Heidegger, phenomenology refers to a commitment—namely, a commitment to observing the phenomena as they appear of themselves. We call this the phenomenological commitment. Attuning to phenomena as they appear of themselves—that is to say, to the event of appearance—is proper when looking to describe the condition which makes that appearance possible. For Heidegger, a description of that condition is the science of fundamental ontology.

We can remember that in the first introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger repeats Aristotle, “μ ψυχη τα οντα πως εσιν” (“man’s soul is, in a certain way, entities”). Heidegger begins with Aristotle in order to define his phenomenological method. He will use it to investigate the principal question of Being and Time—namely, “meaning of being”. For Heidegger, answering the meaning of being must be done by way of “man’s relationship to being”. This means that when an inquirer investigates the meaning of being, whatever shows itself will always be in relationship to that questioner. According to Heidegger, I am always asking about my relationship to being. For this reason, the relationship is referred to as mine. Yet, we can remember that for Heidegger nothing like a “mind” or “soul substance” enters his metaphysical description. The relationship cannot be situated in the mind or soul of some individual. Rather, Heidegger describes the relationship in terms of being in the world—or da sein. Therefore, Heidegger translates Aristotle’s ψυχη (psykhe) as “man’s relationship to beings”. We might say that this translation of ψυχη is the basis of the phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle.

Given this method for answering the principal question of Being and Time, I can understand why Dugin chose this emphasis as our point of departure for considering da sein as both subiectum as the subject matter of fourth political theory. It is a natural starting point. After all, the phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle appears at the outset of Heidegger’s study. That interpretation prefaces all that follows. At the same time, we must also remember that the mine-ness of da sein presents a burden for Heidegger. We are warned, early in the development of Being and Time, that starting from the position of something like an I might lead to deception. From section twenty-five, we remember,

“The assertion that it is I who in each case da sein is, is ontically obvious; but this must not mislead us into supposing that the route for an ontological interpretation of what is ‘given’ in this way has thus been unmistakably prescribed. Indeed it remains questionable whether even the mere ontical content of the above assertion does proper justice to the stock of phenomena belonging to everyday da sein. It could be that the ‘who’ of everyday da sein just is not the ‘I myself’.”

For this reason, Heidegger must confess that,

“The word ‘I’ is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator, indicating something which may perhaps reveal itself as its ‘opposite’.”

A definition of the “opposite” which Heidegger had teased comes to fruition in Being and Time, section twenty-seven. We can recall the famous formulation, “the ‘who’ [of da sein] is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the das Man”. Therefore, we can say that when Heidegger translates Aristotle’s ψυχη (psykhe) as “man’s relationship to beings”, “man” does not refer to anyone in particular, but rather to das Man (the “one”) or any one of us. We might also note that personal pronouns such as mine and yours not only signal possession, but are often used to describe various relationships between objects. This is not accidental; it reiterates the relationship which constitutes the substantiality of da sein. At the same time, this assignment of possession encourages us to think about the relativity of da sein. And this runs counter to Heidegger’s understanding of da sein as a description of the common condition for the various things within the world. Therefore, we must understand da sein without the assignment of location. To do so, we can recall from Heidegger’s later compositions, following the abandonment of Being and Time. We might consider either Das Ding (“The Thing”, 1950), or Bauen Wohnen Denken (“Building Dwelling Thinking”, 1951). In both texts, Heidegger implements the language of a fourfold (earth, heaven, divinities, and mortals [things that are dying]) which is mediated by a location (the thing which is “here”) and indicates being in the negation of things. Immediately, we notice that in these texts, Heidegger has transported “the here” of da sein out of anything like “soul of man”. When we follow Heidegger into these later texts, and retain the project of understanding da sein as simply “being there”, we can say that the presence of the things of the world (including the I, myself and you) indicate a common location which is announced by declarations such as “here!” When we speak colloquially, saying that, “I am here and you are here”, we are also metaphysically correct. We share the common location announced by the declaration “here!” (da sein). Yet, this location is not temporal, nor is the location able to be spatially located. Rather, the declaration indicates a primordial location, prior to either temporal or spatial categories. Likewise, it is prior to mental or physical, interior or exterior categories. Because this location indicates this priority, it encourages an investigation into the structure of that priority; in other words, it encourages the description of a transcendental architectonic. I understand that one such attempt is Being and Time. That description of “the here” follows when treating “man” with special priority. Other attempts can be made. It seems that equating this non-temporal and non-spatial location “the here” with the location of Being (capital “B”) seems to be Heidegger’s best attempt at a description of “the truth of beings” following Being and Time.

Having recapitulated Heidegger’s understanding of da sein, we now ask: what is the case for Dugin? I have noted that while explaining his understanding of da sein during our conversation, he explicitly signaled to himself. This signal located da sein at the phenomenon of Alesksandr Dugin; it indicated that da sein was inside of him or at his location. This reminds us of the traditional translations of ψυχη as “mind” or “soul”. Moreover, by signaling to his location, I assume Dugin suggested that I have da sein in me, as well—or at least, da sein can be located at my phenomenon. Or we might say that da sein can be located at the phenomenon of Alesksandr Dugin and at Justin Carmien. Furthermore, we might presume that da sein might be located at the location of many other objects, as well. Therefore, it follows that Dugin either considers da sein a plurality or there is a plurality of da sein. Probably both. However, before we can consider that further, it must be said, already now, that Dugin has not followed Heidegger into his later works, where da sein was abandoned in favor of the description of a common and shared location prior to either of us. This means that Dugin does not follow the move of relocating the subiectum outside of da sein (the being of human being). Whether or not Dugin’s assignment of location at the phenomenon of physical objects follows faithfully to Being and Time is yet to be seen. Furthermore, we are yet to consider the consequences which follow from locating da sein in physical space, and thereby suggesting some form of plurality of da sein. However, before considering these consequences to Dugin’s assignment of location, our reflections on Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle has already provided the occasion for encountering our first important distinction of Dugin’s interpretation of fourth political theory which drew from our conversation.

Fourth political theory: confounding phenomenon and their description

We remember that Heidegger’s phenomenological commitment makes clear the method of his investigation; but he also makes clear his science and the relationship between the two—specifically, that only by way of phenomenology can we encounter ontologic (οντως λογος)—that is, a “logic” by which to understand how phenomena come into accord with one another. The science of fundamental ontology describes that accordance. Yet, we must also infer more than what Heidegger made explicit when announcing his method. Specifically, we must note that just as with any other science, fundamental ontology cannot surmount the question as to who is making the inquiry into such beings. This, of course, does not discredit the content observed in fundamental ontology. If we were to assume this to be the case, then we would also have to assume that no science could ever arrive at its objects, and would always remain a “subjective” description discovering objects relative to its questioner. We could never have the composite image of a blackhole, for example, but only that image, as it is experienced and subsequently described by its observers. To be sure, making a scientific inquiry means to have taken up a logic in order to explain the phenomenal experience. Therefore, a decision must be made. In any investigation, the investigator must remain inside the science, asking questions according to the logic which guides that science; or he must stand on the outside and question the logic itself. Only with this understanding can we support a description of the real, whether that reality is of the transcendental or the physical. In other words, whoever has found himself observing the architecture of “the here”, must also treat “the here” as a subject matter distant from himself. If this follows, then the inquirer must remain distinct from the subiectum of the science of ontology. Of course, this qualification says very little about ontology, but it says a great deal about science, generally. It is my understanding that Heidegger became aware of the potential confusion which arises when this qualification is not explicit. In Being and Time, Heidegger was not explicit enough. His awareness came only after abandoning Being and Time, having confronted its “noncomprehension” among his peers. Let us now attempt to clear up this confusion which Heidegger left to Dugin’s inheritance.

Consider that one of Heidegger’s main contributions to the transcendental architecture was to account for the human animal’s πραξις (praxis, “application or use of knowledge, practice, convention, habit, custom”). Πραξις is the subject matter of the first division of Being and Time. Present at hand objects are explanatorily dependent on the more primordial ready to hand. According to Heidegger’s explanation, the ready to hand announce themselves through the human animal’s πραξις. In Kantian terms, objectivity (presence at hand) is grounded in subjectivity (ready to hand). Of course, the ready to hand is a theoretical (present at hand) object which belongs to Heidegger’s transcendental architecture and, as such, belongs to the science of ontology. As such, we are able to suggest that this object is in Heidegger’s ψυχη. That statement would be true, of course—but only from within certain projects. Importantly, from within those projects, we would then not treat the ready to hand as such, but rather as a presence at hand object—one which is communicable as being “in the ψυχη” of Heidegger. Yet, Heidegger is attempting to explain how theoretical objects (present at hand), such as the theoretical ready to hand, are possible “in our ψυχη” by way of modification of the human animal’s πραξις. Therefore, it only muddles the first project (a description of the transcendental architectonic) to remind ourselves that this architectonic is being described by Heidegger or is in Heidegger’s ψυχη. In my conversation with Dugin, I did attempt to approach this problem. However, Dugin did not follow my lead. Today, I derive one conclusion from this: Dugin does not understand the necessary separation of phenomena and their description. Instead, he understands that both belong together as metaphysics and the physical experience. While this might appear to be the admirable and correct move, it also obscures the identification of the subject matter of fourth political theory. Dugin seems to reject my entire preface to our conversation. However, I retort: the one who is doing science (the object called “the Self”, which refers to the phenomenon of the Self) and the subiectum (which provides the explanatory condition of the Self) belong to two different domains of description. This is a distinction which Heidegger does not ignore. Nor can I. As such, this becomes the first important distinction of Dugin’s interpretation of fourth political theory. When doing fourth political theory, Dugin does not let science fulfil its function as descriptive. Rather, he interprets science as ontological. This means that, for Dugin, the description which the science of ontology produces is tantamount to the phenomena itself. But we all understand quite well that this cannot be. The objects of the science of ontology merely serve to explain the being of the Self. There is no “reality” or substance to them outside of their ability to explain my being. As the saying goes, “the map is not the terrain.” Therefore, to repeat: the science of ontology is descriptive; while the objects of this science (such as “my da sein”) are not phenomenal themselves. Dugin makes a categorical error if he confounds the two.

Now, because Dugin does not appear to acknowledge the necessary separation of phenomena and their description, we must conclude that his interpretation of fourth political theory is confounded. Moreover, we might consider that confounding the Self with the subiectum also makes ananthropological move. To be sure, when investing da sein with content, and proceeding to study that content, we switch disciplines. To the point, we go from metaphysics to anthropology. In fact, Dugin’s statements from The Fourth Political Theory (2009)confirm his move. Repeating from that book, “Every individual and every culture possesses their own da sein.” This not only gives substantiality to da sein, but also signals the plurality of da sein. His treatment of da sein then becomes political. For myself, Dugin’s animation of the plurality of da sein tells me that his metaphysics are guided by his political activism—and this is the reverse of what I would consider admirable. Of course, Dugin’s political motivation is quite well documented. His expressed opponent during the time of our conversation was globalism. He foreshadows a multipolar world. Therefore, Dugin’s metaphysics are guided by the distinct political prescription of relativism. Consider that in our conversation, Dugin explicitly expressed support for the Black Lives Matter movement—specifically, as a way to seek the supposed “African da sein”. And because Dugin is guided by an understanding of the plurality of da sein, and because relativism is itself problematic, relativism must also become an issue for Dugin. Therefore, we must consider truth relativism next. However, before moving on to our next distinction of Dugin’s interpretation of fourth political theory and relativism, I want to record a tangential thought regarding what should be called Dugin’s ethnic realism. This realism treats ethnicity as something prior to the Self. Ethnicity is a condition of the Self; it is real; and, political strategies follow from this metaphysics. In this tangential reflection, I would like to triangulate the political strategies of A) Dugin, B) the progressive left, and C) liberalism.

First, Dugin’s expressed endorsement of Black Lives Matter, vindicates my prior description of Dugin as an identity politics liberal—a critique I first launched against him in this YouTube video, but which became more refined in the annotated bibliography of How to Nurture Truth and Authenticity. At the same time, I can see that the identity politics liberal surely mistakes Dugin when it insists that Dugin is a fascist. It is clear to me that Dugin follows the same moves as the American progressive left, especially. Both are ethnic realists who replace the subject of liberalism with the identity group subject—for example, “the Black community” or “the LGBTQ+ community”, just to name a couple of cases. For both the progressive left and for Dugin, ethnicity is something prior to the Self; ethnicity is a condition of the Self. As such, both stand in a metaphysical opposition to “classical” liberalism. Yet, to be clear, the liberal, the progressive left, and Dugin are all in alignment on another account. Each of them champions for rights—specifically, the right for any one group to exist. Rights are the cornerstone of liberal political activity. Liberalism once fought against the English monarchy, now the ethnic realist strand of liberalism fights against Western hegemony and a United States-led economic and cultural imperialism—the Black Lives Matter movement fights these opponents from the inside and Dugin fights them from the outside. Dugin’s fight makes use of weapons such as “my da sein” and “your da sein”, which establish a concrete and seemingly impassable barrier. With this impassable barrier in place, Dugin then suggests that the correct political strategy is for each da sein to seek its truth. (In our conversation, Dugin called this truth-seeking economy “the monarchy”.) I note that this “separate but equal” political strategy weds the American progressive left with Dugin, but also positions them in opposition to the color-blind strategy of “classical” liberalism.

Dugin’s relativism and his two-chair position

In the previous reflection, I repeated words from Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory—“Every individual and every culture possesses their own da sein.” Dugin is also known for saying that, “We have our own Russian Truth”. Both of these statements make clear that Dugin is a truth relativist. I have contended for some time now that this understanding of the nature of truth is incongruent with Heidegger’s teachings. Heidegger, like G.W.F. Hegel before him, is anti-relativist. What is interesting then, is that during our conversation, I understood Dugin as acknowledging his truth relativism is incongruent with Heidegger’s teachings. Remarkably, Dugin even touted his truth relativism as virtuous when compared against the anti-relativism of Hegel and Heidegger. Now, because Dugin’s self-praise strikes me as immoral, we must consider the metaphysics more thoroughly. In other words, we must consider truth relativism.

If I return to our conversation, then I remember my attempt to confront Dugin’s relativism. To do so, I attempted to circumvent the plurality of “my da sein” and “your da sein”. As an alternative, I suggested that there is only ever one da sein. This was done by drawing our attention to the fact that he (a Russian) and I (an American) have much in common. Possibly, I have more in common with Dugin than I do with many of my fellow Americans. And presumably he, more in common with me than many Russians. To be sure, there are many Russians who find Dugin detestable. My suggestion was to reveal the nature of “the here” of da sein, which cannot be grounded in one’s divisible tradition, but rather in common projection. Of course, I can admit that when Dugin and I were in conversation, we did bring a heritage (Heidegger’s Sichüberliefern, literally, “a handing down to oneself”) into “the here”, but this was only possible on account that we were commonly projected. Our joint project was to enlighten Heidegger’s da sein and Dugin’s relationship to fourth political theory. It was this common project which made possible the bringing of heritage into “the here”. Without that project, no presencing of the heritage could have been possible. Heidegger himself is clear on this: the future maintains priority to Sichüberliefern. Therefore, Dugin and I shared a common da sein in the “ecstatic moments” of our conversation. Our shared da sein had less to do with him being Russian and me being American. And this remains the case even when the Russian identity or the American identity was offered up for consideration. (Note: when the Russian or American identity was offered for consideration, this was not da sein itself, but was a present at hand object available for our manipulation in our shared and common da sein). I understand that any moment is conditioned on a singular da sein. This understanding follows Heidegger. The being of anything at hand owes its explanation to da sein. This includes any object we call you or me. Another way to say this: my understanding of da sein is metaphysical while Dugin’s is anthropological. Yet, Dugin must deny this. And because he does, he sits in two chairs. On one hand, Dugin is anti-relativist (his truth is spelled out in Russian Orthodoxy) and his Russian da sein, “Russian truth”, and “Russian Monarchy” are quite consistent with Heidegger’s metaphysics and his anti-relativism. On the other hand, Dugin is relativist (ananthropologist and an identity-politics liberal).

Now, as I have made clear, Dugin’s politics have conditioned his interpretation of the metaphysics of Being and Time—and this is the reverse of what I would consider admirable. All the same, I should also sympathize with Dugin’s politics. After all, I can understand the political strategy which champions for the protection and liberation of non-Western traditions and ethnic groups which must resist Western hegemony and a United States-led economic and cultural imperialism. However, even when admitting this, I can still question if the character of his political activism is correct. In the next section, I will argue that Dugin’s resistance to Western hegemony is a nay-saying political activity. Moreover, this nay-saying is inconsistent with Heidegger’s own political philosophy. In other words, I will argue that Heidegger’s political philosophy is not sociologically critical, but is rather (and as should be expected, following all that has been said regarding the priority of the future) projective.

Heidegger’s Democracy

In order to shed light on Dugin’s resistance to Western hegemony as a nay-saying political activity, we can contrast it to Heidegger’s projective political activity. Of course, Heidegger’s political philosophy is the subject of much debate. Therefore, we must take the time to return to Heidegger’s political philosophy before understanding the nature of Heidegger’s political activity. Through this interpretation, we will see how Dugin’s political activity is opposite to that of Heidegger’s—with Dugin’s being the more reprehensible despite Heidegger’s affiliations with National Socialism.

Returning to Heidegger’s philosophy, we can recall the fragments from his compositions following the publication of Being and Time—particularly, fragments from his lecture material on Friedrich Nietzsche—which come down to us by way of David Farrell Krell and Frank Capuzzi’s English translations of material first presented in 1936 at the University of Freiburg. In this material, Heidegger attempted to defend Nietzsche’s philosophy from moral and biological interpretation by the Nazi ideologue Alfred Baeumler. (You should take notice of the dates of these compositions, the last of which was completed in 1947.) In the defense, we find Heidegger reflecting on the δημιουργος (demiurgos, “person who makes, creator”). To be sure, Heidegger understands δημιουργος, not in the sense of a god-creator—which Heidegger designates as φυτουργoς (fytourgos)—but as a craftsman who produces the ιδεα (idea, “idea”) of the δημος (demos, “the public, the people”). That is to say, the δημιουργος produces the outward appearance of the world within the commerce of the public usage of things and of communal life. This creative activity is the essence of Heidegger’s democracy. Not only does Heidegger’s democracy emphasize participation in the creation of the δημος, but the δημιουργος is especially animated in public figures. To be sure of this, we can turn towards Heidegger’s own political activity and his endorsed the führerprinzip (“leader principle”—a core concept of the German National Socialist regime which asserted that ultimate authority rested with the Führer). For Heidegger, the Führer (“leader”) is an especially pronounced manifestation of ιδεα and, as such, especially representative of the δημος. Of course, on this point, many have critiqued Heidegger—this includes Dugin. However, I contend that Dugin has interpreted Heidegger’s endorsement of the führerprinzip too hastily. He has done so, not on account of Heidegger’s own words, but on account of the historical realities of National Socialism, particularly as it manifested in Germany during Heidegger’s time. Therefore, I will correct Dugin by placing Heidegger’s endorsement of the führerprinzip within Heidegger’s participatory form of democracy.

When understanding democracy as a participatory activity (that is, as the governance of the social commerce of human animals as they create value in their lives), then the production of the δημιουργος is, and can only ever be, a manifestation of ιδεα insofar as the δημιουργος is equal in its being as the δημος. That is to say, the ιδεα essentially belongs to the people. Therefore, if the δημιουργος is present in the being of the Führer, then it is only so insofar as the Führer manifests the people’s ιδεα. The δημιουργος can only ever merely present the ιδεα through the act of producing, being as one such instance of the people. Consequently, if the ιδεα is not of the δημος, then neither is the being of the producer as the δημιουργος. Consider that not only the Führer manifests the ιδεα, but also other public figures such as authors, musicians, artists, legislators, architects, et cetera. Heidegger’s democracy is thoroughly participatory at all levels, always conditioned on Entwurf (“projection”), and this means that the people of various trades and vocations govern themselves through their joint projective economic activity. If this is the case, then Heidegger’s conception of democratic participation is not to be found in liberal or social law, but rather in law providing for the creation of things of value. However, the Führer’s orders of creation are absolute only insofar as they manifest the “will of the people”, as we say.

Of course, Dugin’s repudiation of Heidegger’s endorsement of the führerprinzip allows Dugin to stand against Heidegger, the Nazi—a repudiation which reflects well on Dugin’s own reputation. However, once we have understood Heidegger’s political philosophy as the creation of things of value, then no repudiation of Heidegger is in order. I do judge Dugin on this point and I understand Heidegger’s endorsement of the führerprinzip as consistent with his philosophy. It should also be noted that during our conversation, I did offer an opportunity where Dugin could have saved his character, thus changing my judgement about him. I had asked if he was actively working to produce the Russian ιδεα in the greater Russian economy (or, in Dugin’s language, “seek” the “Russian Monarchy”). Yet, he offered no answer. As such, Dugin’s political activity remains thoroughly nay-saying insofar as it is merely resistance to Western hegemony and a United States-led economic and cultural imperialism. This constitutes the third distinction of Dugin’s relationship to fourth political theory: Dugin does not follow Heidegger in giving priority to projection, rather his fourth political theory neglects this feature of the metaphysical architecture, instead giving priority to history and tradition. Dugin is a conservative, ethnic realist, and identity-politics liberal.

Fourth political theory contra first economics philosophy

I have now contended that Heidegger’s truth is anti-relativist and that his political philosophy is projective. When thinking about a historical characterization of Heidegger, these features might qualify him as a modernist. In contrast, Dugin’s political activism manifests as antithesis. The character of his activism follows the socially-critical aesthetics of postmodernist works of art—a literary form indicating a profound suffering from alienation, rootlessness, estrangement, apathy, and resentment. These symptoms were quite popular during the late second millennium and during Dugin’s rise to fame. Furthermore, we can remark that alienation, rootlessness, estrangement, apathy, and resentment are consequent of the giantism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We can note that this giantism also encouraged the secular, relativistic, and inauthentic position; this position manifests in Dugin, the sociologist. According to these characterizations, Dugin is undeniably a postmodernist. Of course, the question then finally arises, if Dugin is not exercising a political activism which coheres with Heidegger’s political philosophy and Heidegger’s own political activity, and if Dugin’s aesthetic character is outright antagonistic to Heidegger’s, then is Dugin doing a “fourth political theory” at all? This question remains outstanding to this day; I will not answer it at this time. Rather, I will draw your attention to one closing reflection which occurred during my conversation with Dugin. At that time, I offered the controversial suggestion that for those of us sitting in the United States, we are less burdened by the need for critique, insofar as we do not need to oppose Western hegemony and United States-led economic and cultural imperialism from the outside. Rather, by addressing this political stasis from the inside, our political activity may still manifest as projective. Today, I do not know if I am willing to defend this claim. However, if I am correct, then what is required in the United States political canvas is not merely the announcement of a political theory which takes Heidegger’s da sein as its subject matter, but also a strategy for creating new value, going beyond the corruption which is present in either of our current political parties.

For my part, I have announced the thinking space of first economics philosophy and offered platform opportunities in my How to Nurture Truth and Authenticity. That work offers options for federal level law stimulating a public goods economy. Specifically, I call for governance-as-projection. In another work, The Nascent Demographic, I describe a strategy for such laws—namely, a Democratic Party realignment. I propose this realignment not at the federal level of government, but instead in local city and county municipalities which are already identifying opportunities for civic engagement and flexing various forms of participatory democratic mechanisms. (Note: I understand that the Democratic Party is closer to Heidegger’s democracy than the Republicans.)

If we now contrast Dugin’s interpretation of fourth political theory to first economics philosophy, we can say that Dugin proposes ethnic nationalism, while the directives of first economics philosophy suggest a civic form of nationalism. Of course, for those of us living in the United States, there can be no other option. Today, the American identity is unknown. It is up to us and those coming after us to constitute our “nation”. However, the “American nation” could never be dyed in patriotism and nostalgia. Rather, it could only ever be defined by the total political, social, economic, and civil fabric of the United States; by weaving this fabric, we constitute the character of our national identity. The American nation is one not seen or heard, but one which is felt at each intersection where the rich histories within the public body confront each other. I understand that encouraging the American nation requires nurturing those intersections. Therefore, when I propose the realignment of the Democracy Party, and the introduction of the National Democrat (opposite to the Liberal or Social Democrat), I emphasize National Democracy. This form of democracy can be constituted as a rule by a people who understand themselves as being able to presence their national spirit in each unique encounter, when one American confronts another. Only this program can address our sense of alienation, rootlessness, estrangement, apathy, and resentment within the United States. Furthermore, I have not encountered any metaphysics which provide a description of the conditions for this civic and economic activity better than those of Martin Heidegger.

Of course, much more can be said regarding first economics philosophy and fourth political theory—OR first economics philosophy as a fourth political theory within the United States canvas. Regarding that second project, I understand that Dugin may be valuable. However, it is up to him if he would like to consider further fourth political theory within the United States together with me.